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At What Cost?:
Spanish Neutrality in the First World War
Carolyn S. Lowry
ABSTRACT
While historians have gone to great efforts in studying the belligerent powers
during the First World War, very little attention has been paid to such neutral powers as
Spain. Several European nations declared neutrality in 1914, but many strayed from this
course in favor of active belligerence. Spain, however, remained neutral for the war’s
duration; thus, this thesis examines and explores the nature of Spanish neutrality during
the First World War.
Spain’s decision to adhere to a neutral policy required serious consideration as it
had to weigh the consequences and advantages of intervention; however, military and
economic weakness, as well as diplomatic isolation pushed Spain towards neutrality.
Some hoped by abstaining from involvement, their country would emerge at the war’s
end as the arbiter of peace, enabling Spain to regain prestige and reestablish itself as a
major continental power. However, neutrality proved to be a difficult undertaking
because Spain could not escape the hardships and effects of a continental war. As
domestic crises enveloped the country, a divided public aligned itself into Francophiles
and Germanophiles. Escalating domestic issues became exacerbated by diplomatic
conflicts resulting from the German submarine warfare campaign, which challenged
Spain’s neutrality policy.
ii

Thus, Spain found itself in a precarious position during the war. While
recognizing the necessity to maintain neutrality, it suffered serious consequences for its
decision. It did not emerge from the war as an arbiter of peace, but suffered diplomatic
humiliation over its failure to overcome the German submarine threat. The government’s
focus on foreign policy led its leaders to ignore the growing domestic discontent, which
further destabilized an already unsteady government. As a result, governments rose and
fell as all proved incapable of resolving Spain’s ever-increasing problems.
The case of Spain in the First World War demonstrates that neutrality is not
necessarily the safe course that many believe, as no country can fully escape the effects
of war. As a neutral, Spain faced incredible difficulties. The government’s neutrality
policy kept Spain out of the war, but the regime faced the significant consequences of this
decision including its ultimate demise.

iii

Introduction
Neutrality is not impartiality.1
What is neutrality? For some, it is a sign of cowardice, a perceived unwillingness
for a nation to take a stand against right and wrong. For others, neutrality represents the
ability of a nation to transcend the historic barbarities of war in favor of a more
enlightened, civilized method of diplomacy. However, regardless of an individual’s
personal views on the policy of neutrality, it is a significant decision made by a nation to
abstain from conflict. Merriam-Webster defines neutral as “not favoring either side in a
quarrel, contest, or war.”2 Thus, neutrality is not a simple decision to avoid involvement;
rather, it is a calculated choice made by a government to remain uninvolved militarily, as
well as avoid any semblance of favoritism to either party. In spite of this, as writer
Hermógenes Cenamor related, “Neutrality is not impartiality.” He further explained that a
neutral nation:
is able to be divided in its opinions of the war, according to the passions and interests of the
political parties. It is inevitable that a neutral state and the nation it represents have an opinion
about the war and the result of neutrality is always benevolence or hostility to one of the
belligerents.3

Neutrality can create the same divisions as war. As a nation embarks on a neutral policy,
it is virtually impossible to eliminate or disregard the passions that emerge on both sides.

1

Hermógenes Cenamor, Los intereses materiales de España en la guerra europea (Madrid: Librería de la
Vuida de Pueyo, 1916), 163.
2
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “neutral.”
3
Cenamor, Los intereses materiales de España, 163-164.
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While these preferences do exist, the purpose of the government is ultimately to set
personal views aside in order to follow the best course of action for the country.
Therefore, while the declaration of war is a monumental decision, the choice to remain
neutral brings with it significant diplomatic and domestic consequences as was the case
with Spain during World War I.
The First World War wreaked havoc throughout the world as fighting exploded
on three continents and the great powers converged in a conflict that would leave millions
dead and wounded, four empires destroyed, and the world attempting to cope with the
horrors of 1914-1918. The impact of the war upon the belligerents is apparent. Britain
and France faced complete devastation at the war’s end as they wrestled with countless
losses and economic ruin. Yet, they were the victors. Russia dissolved into revolution in
1917 and the defeated powers — Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey — saw their
previous influence dissipate. Even the smaller powers such as Italy, Romania, and
Bulgaria faced tremendous hardships as a result of the war.
However, while one expects adversity in war, the First World War left no nation
untouched, and even the neutral powers did not escape unscathed, particularly Spain. The
case of Spain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows the ultimate demise of one
of Europe’s greatest empires. While Spain had dominated the continent in earlier
centuries, its great empire fell far behind as the world expanded through industrialization
and further imperial conquest. The sluggish pace of its industrial progress left Spain
economically backward, and the country suffered a devastating blow to its position with
the loss of its overseas colonies after the 1898 Spanish-American War. Still reeling from
these circumstances at the outbreak of the war, Spain was in a fragile position. In fact,
2

Turkey, which faced similar circumstances, was often called the “Sick Man of Europe.”
One Spanish journalist recognized the dangerous parallel and questioned whether Spain
was not the “Turkey of the West.”4
When war erupted in 1914, the Spanish government analyzed the possible
consequences of intervention. Recognizing the seemingly insurmountable obstacles,
Spain’s leaders realized the country was in no position to become involved in a European
conflict and believed that their lack of participation in the war could ultimately yield a
positive outcome for the struggling nation. As a result, the government immediately
declared the country’s absolute neutrality, throwing Spain into a four-year diplomatic
roller coaster. Unlike its neutral counterparts such as Italy, Romania and Bulgaria, it
avoided active belligerence in the conflict and maintained its neutrality policy for the
war’s duration.
Despite its neutrality, Spain hardly eluded the consequences of war. While the
government prevented Spain from entering the war, it could not prevent the war from
entering Spain as the nation faced the same economic hardships of the belligerents. While
it did experience some economic growth by taking advantage of the great powers’
inability to export, food shortages and a lack of basic necessities created turmoil and
discontent throughout the country. Already economically deficient at the war’s outbreak,
the difficulties introduced by such a widespread conflict furthered the deteriorating
conditions within Spain.

4

Luis Araquistain in España, 2 November 1916, in M. Carmen García-Nieto and Esperanza Yllán
Calderón, Crisis social y dictadura, 1914-1930, vol. 4 of Historia de España 1808-1978 (Barcelona:
Editorial Crítica, 1989), 51-52.
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Exacerbating these economic hardships was Germany’s unrestricted submarine
warfare campaign that ravaged Spanish shipping producing a dangerous diplomatic
situation that nearly drew the nation into war. As the war progressed, Spanish society
divided itself into two factions — francófilos and germanófilos. The destruction caused at
the hands of German submarines furthered this divide as the nation struggled with the
prospect of entering the war. With the Germanophiles staunchly supporting strict
neutrality and the Francophiles demanding at least benevolent neutrality favoring the
Entente, the Spanish government was in an impossible situation.
As the submarine campaign affected Spain’s economy and international standing,
the government wrestled with how to handle its ever-increasing problems. For four years,
the Restoration monarchy, already rooted in instability, struggled to maintain the
hegemonic control it held over the country, and the consequences of war only intensified
their seeming demise. Governments rose and fell as none proved capable of addressing
the serious crises emerging in Spain. However, despite the rising costs, both domestic and
diplomatic, the leaders of Spain maintained the policy of neutrality until the war’s end in
1918.
Although this course of action was not without its consequences, Spain’s leaders
had little choice, given Spain’s inherent instability. Despite the constant pressures to
abandon the neutrality policy, doing so could have proved even more devastating as both
the Central Powers and the Entente posed formidable threats should Spain have chosen to
become involved in the conflict. Author on European neutrality, Efraim Karsh related,
“Not only is neutrality not ‘blessed’ with the traits associated with it – but the successful

4

pursuit of this policy requires the most finely tuned foreign policy instruments.”5 Thus,
while the policies and actions of Spain’s leaders in 1914-1918 have been rightfully
scrutinized and criticized, one cannot ignore the diplomatic endurance required to
maintain this course in the face of such extreme hardship. The results of this policy can
hardly be described as successful and the conduct of Spain’s leaders often appeared more
cowardly than diplomatically sound. However, as King Alfonso XIII of Spain explained
in 1917, “Each of us in his own sphere must do his duty for the well-being and honor of
Spain.”6

5

Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and the Small States (London: Routledge, 1988), 32.
King Alfonso XIII in Sir Charles Petrie, King Alfonso XIII and His Age (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd.,
1963), 127.
6
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Chapter One
The Roots of Instability
The tragedy of Spanish public life is the absolute absence of passion, the indifference, the
shrinking of shoulders with an uncivil “what is it to me.”1
Spain’s government during the First World War had its roots in instability, which
would only be exacerbated in the crises that developed from the war. Antonio Cánovas de
Castillo was the architect of the Restoration Monarchy with Alfonso XII (1875-1885) and
established its constitution in 1876. He argued that, “This is the only way to form the
mold a dynasty needs in order to have a solid monarchical institution.”2 He determined
that a stable Spanish government must consist of a two-party system in which a Liberal
and Conservative party alternated in power. Along with Liberal leader Práxedes Mateo
Sagasta, Castillo crafted the turno pacífico (the peaceful rotation).3
The Restoration’s early years were marked by repressive measures intended to
regain control lost following years of revolts and revolutions. They limited voting rights
to only landowners and capacidades, those with high levels of education or academic
titles.4 However, to maintain the political order, the government realized the need to
convey authenticity in the voting system. Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth century,
the government instituted more liberal reforms such as relaxed censorship laws and male
suffrage in 1890. These changes created the false appearance of Spain as one of the more
1

Luis Araquistain, Entre la guerra y la revolucion (Madrid: 1917), 144.
M. Carmen García-Nieto and Esperanza Yllán Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 18741914, vol. 3 of Historia de España 1808-1978 (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1989), 16.
3
Raymond Carr, ed., Spain: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 223.
4
García-Nieto and Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 17.
2
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democratic European nations. But these devices only served to conceal the monopoly of
power enjoyed by the governing elite. In fact, this “Restoration” was founded through the
manipulation of the very democratic ideals they had purportedly established. In reality,
the government functioned only through the rigging of elections known as caciquismo.5
The caciquismo achieved the desired election results by manipulating the
Ministerio de la Gobernación (Ministry of the Interior), which ensured the turno
continued unabated. The heart of the caciquismo were the caciques, landowners,
officials, moneylenders, lawyers, priests or other people of local authority, who formed
the backbone of the Spanish political structure.6 They possessed unlimited powers in their
respective areas and established a clientelist network that guaranteed the necessary results
to maintain the turno. Valentí Almirall, a Catalan political activist spoke out against this
system in his book, Espagne telle qu’elle est (Spain Such as It Is). “If we wanted to list
all the forms of fraud used in Spain to overturn universal male suffrage or limit it to the
whims of the government, we would never finish.” He expanded upon this by saying, “I
have seen many times that my father, in spite of having died years ago, has gone to place
his ballot in the box under the watchful eye of a city official or a policeman dressed in a
borrowed suit.”7 Yet despite this corruption, the Restoration continued to function
because of the apathy of the people. Almirall proved to be the exception as the majority
of Spaniards allowed themselves to be controlled and manipulated by the caciques.
This caciquismo political structure dominated Spain until the latter part of the war
5

José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds., Spanish History Since 1808 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 91.
6
Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918: Between War and Revolution (London: Routledge,
1999), 2.
7
Valentí Almirall, Espagne telle que’elle est (Paris: Albert Savine, 1887), 141-52 as quoted in Jon Cowans,
ed., Modern Spain: A Documentary History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 71-73.
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and played a key role in the maintenance of the Restoration regime. It was, however,
judged by other countries as a major hindrance to Spain’s future. In an article written
during the war, American political scientist Charles H. Cunningham stated:
Although the cost of necessities of life has reached almost unsupportable proportions and the
coasts of Spain are blockaded by the German submarines… these facts have had little effect in
giving to the average Spaniard any definite point of view or attitude toward the great struggle. He
thinks little about the actualities of the situation, but leaves the entire solution of the matter to the
‘government,’ in which, evidently, he has no part.8

These thoughts were echoed by a Spanish journalist who wrote to a French colleague,
“Believe me, political apathy continues to dominate Spain…. Even in raising the famous
spectre of war, the professionals will not succeed in awakening political life in Spain.”9
Relying upon this apathy, the Restoration functioned fairly smoothly for twentyfive years, until a crisis emerged that raised doubts about its government’s effectiveness.
In 1897, Castillo died and the Spanish-American War immediately followed in 1898
resulting in the disastrous loss of its remaining American and Asian colonies, including
Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam. El Desastre came as a shock to the
Spanish, whose national culture maintained the illusion that the world still considered
Spain at least a middle-ranking world power. However, this significant imperial defeat
occurred at a peak in Europe’s “New Imperialism” when a nation’s status as a world
power depended largely upon colonial possessions. Thus, Spaniards faced the realization

8

Charles H. Cunningham, “Spain and the War,” The American Political Science Review 11, no. 3 (August
1917): 422.
9
Gerald Meaker, “A Civil War of Words: The Ideological Impact of the First World War on Spain, 19141918,” in Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-23, ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1988), 7.
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that according to some nations Spain was, as Lord Salisbury called it, a “dying nation.”10
Conservative leader, Francisco Silvela echoed Lord Salisbury’s words in an article
entitled, “Sin Pulso” (Without a Pulse) in which he wrote of the end of Spain’s “destiny
as a European people.”11 As Salisbury and Silvela’s words echoed through the Spanish
press and the illusion of world status shattered, segments of the Spanish population began
to question their political system, as well as their nationhood. One weekly magazine
wrote, “Today the question for us, not the main but the only and exclusive question, is
one of life or death; one of whether we continue to exist as a nation or not.”12
Following El Desastre, an outcry arose from the cultural elites of Spain —writers,
poets, philosophers —who became known as the Generation of ’98. They attacked the
ruling regime and denounced the Restoration as the primary cause of Spain’s problems,
lashing out against the caciquismo, industrial and economic backwardness, clericalism
and the decline of their society.13 Many Spaniards blamed the government for involving
the nation in what they perceived to be a “terrible and perhaps unequal struggle.”14
Silvela recognized the changing perceptions toward the government leaders and admitted
that they had failed the population. He expressed:
The failure of the governing classes has been tremendous and a consequence of it is all that socalled regionalism, which is merely the weakness of the cerebral centre,… and the collapse of the

10

Rosario de la Torre del Río, “La prensa madrileña y el discurso de Lord Salisbury sobre ‘las naciones
moribundas’ (Londres, Albert Hall, 4 mayo 1898),” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea, no.
6 (1985): 163-180.
11
El Tiempo, 16 August 1898, as quoted in Francisco Silvela, Artículos, Discursos, Conferencias y Cartas
vol. 2 (Madrid: Mateu Artes Gráficas, 1922-1923), 493-498.
12
“Sed fuertes,” La Ilustración Española y Americana, 8 February 1899, as quoted in Sebastian Balfour,
The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 50.
13
Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain, 21.
14
La Epoca, 10 May 1898, as quoted in Torre del Río, “La prensa madrileña,” 174.
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respect of the people towards their governing classes.15

Although the 1898 disaster caused some Spaniards to lose faith in the Restoration,
the regime remained intact primarily due to the lack of a viable alternative. Class and
regional divisions deepened when Spain lost its colonies, which had been the only major
factor unifying the country. This division produced an identity crisis that destroyed the
complacent nationalism encouraged by the government during the war with the United
States.16 Without any consensus as to how to change the government, the turno remained,
for the most part, intact.
The status quo, however, did not remain completely unchanged. The 1898 defeat
and the resulting uncertainty led to the establishment of new political parties outside the
turno’s Conservative and Liberal factions. Of primary importance was the establishment
of the Lliga Regionalista in 1901, the party of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie. Led by
Francisco Cambó, the Lliga was a socially conservative group that sought a decentralized
political system with Catalan political intervention, which they hoped would win
Catalonian autonomy while benefiting Spain as a whole.17
The rise of the Catalan movement was accompanied by the rise of a Left-wing
Republican party, the Radicals. Alejandro Lerroux, a young journalist, led the Radicals
against the repressive Restoration regime:
This whole gigantic project is opposed by tradition, routine, entrenched privileges, conservative
interests, caciquismo, clericalism, entailed estates, centralism, and the stupid collection of parties
and programs made up by empty heads in the machines that fabricate religious dogma and

15

Francisco Silvela as quoted in Balfour, The End of the Spanish Empire, 61.
Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, eds., Spanish Cultural Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),
28-29.
17
Charles E. Enrlich, “The Lliga Regionalista and the Catalan Industrial Bourgeoisie,” Journal of
Contemporary History 33, no. 3 (July 1998): 400-401 and Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain, 22.
16
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political despotism.18

Lerroux urged violence at every opportunity, and his desire to overthrow the rich gained
him much support from the lower-middle classes, especially in the cities. This increasing
support culminated in the Radicals’ defeat of the Lliga in the elections of 1903.19
The Radicals were by no means the only political group expanding at the turn of
the century. The Spanish labor movement assumed a more organized form, developing
into two opposing regional blocs. Castilla, Asturias and the Basque Country had Socialist
tendencies, while Cataluña, Valencia, Aragón and Andalucía leaned towards AnarchoSyndicalism. The growth of Socialism in Spain was much slower than its AnarchoSyndicalist counterparts. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) was established in 1879
followed by the trade union, La Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), in 1888. The
PSOE, under the leadership of Pablo Iglesias adopted the rhetoric of revolution and the
rise of the proletariat, blaming the humiliating 1898 defeat on the bourgeoisie political
leaders who:
did not take into account the immense economic power of that nation; they did not realize that
wealth is today what gives a nation strength and energy, and they now confront, and make us
confront, all the consequences of such tremendous stupidity.20

While proclaiming themselves as revolutionaries, in practice, they actually focused more
on the daily struggles of the worker. This contradiction between their ideology and their
daily actions produced an inability to realize or address the major issues, such as retarded

18

Alejandro Lerroux, De la lucha: Páginas de Alejandro Lerroux (Barcelona: F. Granada, 1909), 119-20 as
quoted in Cowans, Modern Spain, 103-104.
19
Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 30.
20
Pablo Iglesia, “Our Bourgeoisie,” El Socialista, 17 August 1898, as quoted in Cowans, Modern Spain,
97-98.
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agricultural development and regional diversity.21
As the PSOE-UGT struggled to establish itself, the Anarcho-Syndicalists gained
surprising support from a wide range of groups, from peasants to Catalan workers. Its
foundation rested upon a distrust of the state and a call to action to remedy the problems
plaguing Spain. In 1911, the Anarchists organized a new trade union, the Conferderación
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), with the Anarcho-Syndicalists representing the group’s
most authentic revolutionaries.22 However, the union of these two groups was by no
means the preferred method of revolutionary development. Rather, governmental
repression forced the Anarchists and Syndicalists to unite into one union guaranteeing the
movement would be plagued by internal divisions.23
These rising new parties brought fresh perspectives into Spanish politics and the
government’s ultimate inability to integrate these groups into the existing order would be
a significant destabilizing force within the turno.24 These groups successfully managed to
politically awaken and enlighten portions of the Spanish population. However, these were
not the only forces undermining the Spanish government.
The deaths of Castillo in 1897 and Sagasta in 1903 left a huge void in the turno,
which forced the Conservative and Liberal parties to re-examine their leadership
techniques to counter the rising threat of the new parties. Although each instituted
reforms, their politics were no longer compatible and the compromise that maintained the

21

P. Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 2-3 and F. Pérez Ledesma, El pensamiento socialista español a
comienzos de siglo (Madrid: Centro, 1974), pp. 27-34 as found in Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain, 25.
22
Gerald Meaker, “Anarchists versus Syndicalists: Conflicts within the Conferderación Nacional del
Trabajo, 1917-1923,” in Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain, ed. Stanley G. Payne (New York:
Franklin Watts, 1976), 34.
23
Raymond Carr, Spain, 1808-1939, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 446.
24
García-Nieto and Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 29.

12

turno since 1876 was no longer possible.
Intensifying this situation was King Alfonso’s involvement in Spanish politics by
dissolving and reorganizing the government at will. The ascension of Alfonso XIII to the
throne in 1902 ushered in a monarchy that intervened directly in politics. Even Winston
Churchill recognized this unique characteristic in this king. “But I shall not shrink from
pronouncing now that Alfonso XIII was a cool, determined politician who used
continuously and in full the whole influence of his kingly office to control the policies
and fortunes of his country.”25
In 1903, Antonio Maura became the leader of the Conservative party and served
as Premier from 1903-1904 and during his ‘long government’ of 1907-1909. A former
Liberal who abandoned Sagasta’s party because of internal conflicts, Maura’s main goal
was to eliminate the caciquismo, which he considered the major impediment to
maintaining the regime. He believed that the existence of the caciquismo, which
prevented the people from political involvement, would lead to revolution from below.
Therefore, he hoped to create a revolution from above to prevent the latter.26 He
announced his intentions earlier in a speech to Congress in July 1899 that, “It is a
conviction of all of us that Spain has to go through a revolution; if we do not make it
here, it will be made in the streets.”27 However, Maura encountered stiff opposition from
both internal and external forces.
At the same time, the Liberal party had also attempted to revise the faltering

25

Winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries, (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1937; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973), 216.
26
Junco and Shubert, Spanish History Since 1808, 102.
27
Revista Nacional, nos. 7 and 8, 9 July 1899, 129 as quoted in Balfour, The End of the Spanish Empire,
188.
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system, but both parties suffered enormously from internal conflicts, as well as their
determined opposition to each other. As conflicts deepened, the government’s inability to
address the rising strength of the workers’ movement culminated in a crisis during the
‘Tragic Week’ in the summer of 1909.28
Morocco remained the last imperial Spanish holding, which it vowed to defend at
all cost. After the 1898 Spanish-American War, it could not afford the devastating blow
to its international prestige and national pride that the loss of its portion of Morocco
would cause. Prior to war with the United States, Spain still maintained a significant
imperial presence in the Caribbean and Pacific with control of Cuba, the Philippines,
Puerto Rico and Guam. However, Spain’s crushing defeat forced the country to
relinquish these colonies to the United States. This loss meant that Spain’s last
noteworthy territory was Morocco, which could not be surrendered.
In addition, losing its hold in Morocco would potentially affect Spain’s national
security. Liberal leader Montero Ríos clearly related these fears when he asked:
Does the Government of His Majesty bear in mind that if the North West of Morocco comes under
the domination…of a military or civil Protectorate of France, Spain would be reduced to seeing
herself besieged perpetually in the North and South by the same power?29

Due to its close geographical proximity, Spain emphasized its obvious interest in
Moroccan affairs and viewed any British or French infringement on these affairs as a
threat. Thus, France’s increasing presence in the Morocco ushered in the possibility of
French encirclement that could ultimately push Spain out of its last imperial holding

28

García-Nieto and Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 41.
Montero Ríos quoted in Maura Gamazo, La Cuestíon de Marruecos desde el punta de vista España
(Madrid 1905), 33-34 as found in James A. Chandler, “Spain and Her Moroccan Protectorate 1898-1927,”
Journal of Contemporary History 10, n. 2 (April 1975): 302.

29

14

furthering the nation’s insistence on maintaining its portion.
Following a summer 1909 uprising in the Moroccan Protectorate, army reservists
were called up in Madrid and Barcelona. On 26 July, bloody riots ensued among the
urban workers launching the Semana Tragica (Tragic Week). Although more an attack
against the general workers’ conditions, “conscription for service in a colonial war was
nevertheless a grievance sufficient to act as a catalyst to violence.”30
Severe repression followed the crisis as Maura dealt harshly with those
responsible for the protest. Although supported by a majority in the Cortes, Alfonso XIII
chose to dismiss Maura because he felt the politician’s unpopularity could potentially
undermine the monarchy. As the government fell, the turno faced a serious threat. Maura
was the first and last politician to have a genuine mass following, and his dismissal
resulted in some young Conservatives following Maura in creating a separate Maurista
movement causing the first serious split in one of the two dynastic parties.
Thus, as the tides of war began to embroil the continent, the Spanish government
entered into a period of chaos. From the ascension of Alfonso XIII in 1902 until Primo de
Rivera’s coup d’etat in 1923, there were thirty-three Spanish governments. As war
erupted in 1914, the Restoration government, already unstable and facing a wide array of
new domestic threats, recognized that if it had any hope of preventing its further demise,
its only option with regard to the developing international conflict was the path of
neutrality.

30

Chandler, “Spain and Her Moroccan Protectorate,” 305.
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Chapter Two
“Observer Neutralidad Más Absoluta”
“Spain remains and will remain neutral because this is her firm will.”1
No one realized the devastation that would result from the hostilities that
commenced in the summer of 1914. As Europe quickly divided into opposing blocs, the
Spanish government firmly believed it should not involve itself in a general European
war, regardless of the prevailing ‘short war illusion.’ Thus, when hostilities broke out,
Conservative Prime Minister Eduardo Dato officially declared his country’s neutrality on
30 July.
With great misfortune, war was declared between Germany, on the one side, and Russia, France
and the United Kingdom, while a state of war also exists between Austria-Hungary and Belgium.
The government of your majesty believes it should order the strictest neutrality (más estricta
neutralidad) of Spanish subjects.2

In a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Belgium on 4 August 1914, Foreign
Minister, Marqués de Lema, reinforced Spain’s intention to “observer neutralidad más
absoluta.”3 Thus, the Spanish government did not hesitate in declaring its policy relative
to the growing conflict and would maintain this assurance for the next four years.
Several factors contributed to the Spanish government’s policy of neutrality,
extending from its lack of military power to its ultimate goal to regain lost prestige by
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serving as the arbiter of peace at the war’s end. However, as adamant as Spain’s
politicians were regarding neutrality, it was by no means an easy decision. It involved
serious contemplation as they recognized the potential consequences. Thus, the Spanish
government carefully weighed its options and determined neutrality was the best, and
only, course of action for the struggling nation. It would adhere to the decision despite
numerous diplomatic and domestic threats and challenges. Prime Minister Dato outlined
the reasoning for this course of action in a letter to his former chief Maura dated 25
August 1914:
We would depart from neutrality only if we were directly threatened by foreign aggression or by
an ultimatum…. Germany and Austria are delighted with our attitude as they believe us
compromised with the Entente. France and Britain cannot criticize us as our pacts with them are
limited to Morocco…. I do not fear that the Allies would push us to take sides with or against
them…. They must know that we lack material resources and adequate preparation for a modern
war…. Would not we render a better service to both sides by sticking to our neutrality so that one
day we could raise a white flag and organize a peace conference in our country which could put an
end to the current conflict? We have moral authority for that and who knows if we shall be
required to do so.4

After the Dato-led government made the decision to remain neutral in the growing
conflict, many held Dato’s optimistic views regarding the benefits this policy could bring
Spain. They looked forward to reaping the rewards of avoiding war and hoped to advance
Spain’s position. As Dato conveyed, there were numerous reasons for Spain to pursue
this policy.
One of the primary reasons, as mentioned, was its drastically inferior military
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capability. The Spanish-American War decimated the military. Naval operations in the
Philippines and Cuba destroyed the Spanish squadrons in both areas. In addition, in the
1890s, commencing with the initial uprisings in Cuba and culminating in the 1898 defeat,
the Spanish army suffered nearly 200,000 casualties, not in battle, but as a result of its
inadequate medical corps.5 By 1910, its army had only 80,000 soldiers and 25,000
officers, or a ratio of one officer for every five soldiers.6 Not only was the army small,
but the disproportionately large number of officers prohibited any major reform of the
armed forces. Furthermore, the government devoted approximately forty percent of its
budget to defense, with an astounding seventy percent of the defense budget appropriated
for officers’ salaries.7 While the officer corps naturally defied any attempts to change this
established system, the political leaders also chose not to make any significant changes
because the army symbolized stability for its government.8 Thus, modernization of the
armed forces proved virtually impossible.
In addition to these structural and financial problems within the army, there was
dissension within the army that stemmed from colonial conflict in Morocco and the issue
of combat merits. On the eve of the First World War, Spain was in the midst of the
Moroccan War (1909-1927) hoping to maintain the country’s last imperial holding, but
occupying over half of the country’s inadequately trained troops in the process.9 In
addition, the conflict created discord between peninsulares (those who served in Spain)
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and Africanistas (those who served in Morocco), as the army reintroduced méritos de
guerra (war/combat merits) in 1910 after they were abolished following abuse during the
1898 war. 10 These merits obviously benefited the Africanistas considering they faced
actual combat in Morocco. This further divided the officer corps as a debate ensued
between seniority versus battlefield promotions. Already a problem at the outbreak of the
war, it would reach a critical point in 1917. With its military divided and no financial
means to increase either land or sea forces, Spain could not provide even minimal
military assistance to the belligerents.
Closely related to the army’s difficulties was Spain’s general economic weakness
in 1914. The origin could be traced back to the policies instituted by the Restoration
government at the end of the nineteenth century that ultimately isolated Spain from the
international economy and impeded its own economic expansion. Prior to 1868, the
country had utilized a bimetallic standard with an overvaluation of silver.11 In 1883,
Spain suspended the convertibility of gold and refused to adhere to the gold standard used
by the majority of European nations. Spain’s failure isolated it from the international
economy and resulted in a greater fluctuation of the exchange rate for its peseta. This led
to the slow, continuous drop in its value between 1890 and 1896 with no sign of change
until 1900.12 Another factor in Spain’s economic weakness resulted from their severe
dependence upon tariffs. As the rest of Europe established a world market for grain, made
possible by transportation advances from the Industrial Revolution, Spain reverted to a
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protectionist stance to counter the threat of foreign wheat and other goods. However,
Spain’s archaic agricultural system and the flood of Soviet and U.S. grain into the world
market devastated the Spanish economy.
The instability of the Spanish economy and its isolation from the world economy
created significant problems, including “one of the lowest rates of industrialization in
Western Europe.”13 Spain did not enter the second stage of industrialization until the
1920s, and it has been argued that “the case of Spain is less that of a latecomer than that
of an attempt, largely thwarted, to join the ranks of the first comers.”14 In 1910, twothirds of the population still worked in agriculture, which accounted for approximately
one-third of the gross domestic product. Agricultural backwardness and inadequate
farming practices produced an unstable economy that fluctuated between prosperity and
crisis, greatly retarding Spain’s industrial growth. Urban centers were generally small, as
only ten percent of the population lived in cities with a population over 100,000.
Illiteracy rates were extremely high with thirty-seven percent of men and fifty-eight
percent of women falling into that category. Although Spain finally saw improved growth
and slow structural changes in its economy after 1910, they had made little impact by the
outbreak of the war.15
In addition to military and economic weakness, a two-fold reason for Spain’s
declaration of neutrality was that the European dispute did not affect Spanish interests
and that it was too isolated politically and diplomatically. Jerónimo Bécker’s 1924 study
13

Martín-Aceña, “Spain During the Classical Gold Standard Years,” 160.
Jordi Nadal, “The Failure of the Industrial Revolution in Spain, 1830-1914,” in The Emergence of
Industrial Societies, Part Two, vol. 4 of The Fontana Economic History of Europe, ed. Carlo M. Cipolla
(Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976), 617.
15
James Simpson, “Economic Development in Spain, 1850-1936,” The Economic History Review 50, no. 2
(May 1997): 349 and Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, ed., The Economic Modernization of Spain, 1830-1930
(New York: New York University Press, 1987), 43.
14

20

of foreign policy begins “The dawning of the nineteenth century was a sad day for
Spain.”16 The loss of its long-standing imperial empire and growing political instability,
social conflict and economic backwardness placed Spain in a tenuous situation, and its
foreign policy reflected this weakness.
Upon ascending the throne in 1902, Alfonso XIII was determined to play a key
role in Spain’s foreign policy. His first political move was the selection of his bride. The
Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Britain,
France and Russia) believed that his choice would largely determine his diplomatic
policy relative to these alliances. Because his mother, Queen Maria Cristina was a
Habsburg, many thought he would align himself with the Triple Alliance. Yet, Alfonso
chose Victoria Eugenie of Battenburg, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, bringing
himself and Spain closer to the Triple Entente in a move that was seen by many as a mark
of Spain’s rupture with Germany and Alfonso’s Austro-Hungarian ancestry. Alfonso
firmly believed that Spain’s 1898 defeat resulted from the lack of a permanent alliance,
and this move represented the king’s initial attempt to establish what he deemed was
Spain’s most desperate need —allies.17
As the Great Powers had aligned themselves into opposing blocs, Spain realized it
must avoid complete diplomatic isolation. For Alfonso, the choice was obvious. Since
Britain and France surrounded Spain, his foreign policy would be one dictated by
geography. For London and Paris, on the other hand, Spain posed a potential threat to
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their fundamental interests. Britain’s main concern involved protecting its lifeline
through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to India, while France focused on
defending its southern border in the event of war with Germany. Both nations, united in
their opposition to expanding German influence, believed Spain could serve as a buffer,
and therefore favored rapproachment with Spain. However, rapproachment did not come
easily, as tensions arose when Spain and France clashed over conflicting interests in
North Africa.
By 1900, North Africa had become the key focus in Spain and France’s
imperialistic ambitions. After its colonial losses in 1898, maintaining its position in North
Africa became an obsession for Spain. It considered Morocco as its last opportunity to
retain a sizable colony and restore some of its lost prestige. Contention over the territory
intensified when Britain and France concluded the Anglo-French Entente in 1904,
solidifying France’s position in North Africa. The Entente relegated the two powers to
their respective spheres of influence with France relinquishing its position in the Middle
East to Britain in exchange for a primary role in Morocco. This bound France to negotiate
with Spain regarding conditions in Morocco. Britain and France had ignored Spain in the
treaty negotiations and these North African provisions were not acceptable to Alfonso.18
Although Spain’s role in North Africa was minimal, both Britain and France,
because of their own colonial ambitions, believed it was in their best interests to keep
Spain weak. Their agreement to limit Spanish influence in North Africa particularly
outraged Alfonso who immediately turned to Germany for support. Germany initially
expressed interest in forging a relationship with Spain, but it quickly reconsidered for fear
18
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of alienating the British who opposed full French control of Morocco. London would
seek German assistance, if necessary, to prevent it. Germany’s rebuff forced Alfonso to
renegotiate with Britain and France, resulting in Spain receiving a significantly decreased
share of Morocco and Alfonso’s first, but not last, major setback in foreign affairs.
Morocco would again take center stage in European politics in 1905 and 1911.
Following consummation of the Anglo-French Entente, Germany decided to test the
alliance and Europe by instigating the 1905-1906 Moroccan Crisis. Kaiser Wilhelm II
visited Tangier in March 1905 and announced that he favored Moroccan independence.
The Germans demanded an international conference, which assembled at Algeciras, but
delegates from the convening nations voted to support French claims in Morocco.
Germany again threatened French claims in the region during the 1911 Agadir Crisis
when a German gunboat arrived in Agadir to protect German interests. It culminated with
a German offer to abstain from further conflict in Morocco if it could obtain the French
Congo. The Great Powers again rebuffed the Germans offering some small concessions
in Africa and the crisis ultimately subsided. Although still maintaining a key interest in
Moroccan affairs, Spain played a secondary role in the negotiations. It struggled to
maintain the last remnant of its colonial holdings, but the 1911 Agadir Crisis only
furthered its humiliation by reducing Spain’s Moroccan territory to 18,300 square miles
compared to France’s 460,000.19 Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War, Spain was
surrounded by Britain and France, both determined to keep it weak, while the threat of a
growing Germany loomed in the distance, making neutrality the only diplomatic option.
An additional argument for Spain’s neutrality during the war was the potential to
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regain lost prestige. As mentioned, the 1898 disaster and subsequent failures in foreign
affairs left Spain struggling to re-establish itself as a dominant continental power.
Alfonso and the Spanish government hoped that by remaining impartial, they could
assume a leading role in peace negotiations following the First World War, thereby
gaining diplomatically what they could not achieve on the battlefield. They could only
accomplish this by maintaining contact with the contending alliances. Ambassadors to the
belligerent powers received clear instructions that Spain must “maintain the most
amicable relations with the different states directly involved in the conflict.”20
During summer 1914, most Spaniards appeared to support the decision of
neutrality, initially welcoming it as the only course of action for the country. However,
dissenting voices soon emerged. The Carlists, a dominant right-wing party, were quick to
announce their pro-German sentiments, while the Republican Radicals, led by Alejandro
Lerroux, expressed their support for intervention on behalf of the Entente. However, one
individual especially stunned the nation with his unorthodox perspective on Spain’s
position at the outbreak of war. Count Conde de Romanones, leader of the Liberal party,
voiced his feelings against neutrality in an article published in his newspaper, El Diario
Universal, entitled “Neutralidades que matan” (‘Fatal neutralities’). The article outlined
the disadvantages of a neutral policy. Romanones stated:
‘Neutrality,’ literally means to not be with one or the other. In reality, is Spain really not with one
or the other? Is it able to allow itself to be with one or the other? ... Spain recently signed a treaty
with France with respect to Morocco; Spain shares the Pyrenees front with France; all the sealanes are controlled by England. In economic affairs, France maintains the primary role in our
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imports and exports, followed closely by England. Spain’s economic and geographic destiny then
lies within the orbit of the Entente… Thus, Spain is not able to be neutral because reaching this
decisive moment forces us not to be… Neutrality unsupported by the neutral’s own force is at the
mercy of the first strong state which finds it necessary to violate it… If Germany wins, will she
thank us for our neutrality? No, she will try to rule the Mediterranean. She will not take French
continental territory… We shall lose our hopes of expansion in Morocco. We shall lose our
independence… Nor will German expansion in the economic and industrial domain compensate
us for the ruin of the countries with whom our interests in those respects have been up to now
identified. On the other hand, if the Allies triumph they will owe us no debt of gratitude and will
remodel the map of Europe as they think fit… The die is cast and there is no remedy but to
gamble. Neutrality is not a remedy, but to the contrary, there are fatal neutralities!21

The article had an incredible impact on the Spanish population and government as
this dynastic party leader openly criticized government policy. Romanones did not
necessarily advocate Spain’s entry into the war, but favored benevolent neutrality toward
the Entente. However, the majority of the population disagreed, and this backlash was
enough to force Romanones to deny responsibility for the article on 4 September 1914.
He quickly supported strict neutrality, but the article instilled doubts as to his true
feelings regarding this policy. Authorship would be debated, but Romanones’s influence
was not questioned, and he stated in his memoirs “The article was exclusively mine in
form and inspiration.”22
As autumn approached, the prevailing ‘short war illusion’ proved false, leading
some neutral powers to choose sides. Italy had previously been a member of the Triple
Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, but chose neutrality at the war’s outbreak.
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It ultimately abandoned this policy by joining the Entente in 1915 with Romania
following in 1916. Bulgaria, on the other hand, chose the Central Powers in 1915. Spain
continued to stress absolute neutrality, but could not escape the effects of the war. Don
Francisco de Reynoso, Spanish Ambassador to Switzerland during the war years
commented that:
looking back on them (the war years) now they seem equally incredible, so fantastic and horrible
were the things they brought in their wake, - even to the inhabitants of the neutral countries. For
through the screen of well-guarded frontiers there seeped all the backwash of war.23

Economic hardships and shortages plagued the continent, and while the Spanish
population, which experienced high rates of illiteracy, remained indifferent to the
ideological and political issues that emerged, they were not immune to the economic
consequences of war. Many social, cultural and political groups recognized the
ideological differences of democracy versus autocracy between the belligerents and
began to question the neutrality policy. Thus, neutrality ushered in the expression of the
varied ideological views of the social classes and political parties in Spain.24 Slowly, the
population aligned itself in two camps, creating a ‘civil war of words,’ dividing almost
equally into francófilos and germanófilos. This division extended beyond a mere debate
between two opposing viewpoints; rather it created an intense division that disrupted
families, so much so that even cinemas refused to present war news to prevent fights.25
More importantly, it was an ominous sign of what the future had in store for Spain twenty
years later. A French journalist visiting Madrid in 1917 was quite prescient in this regard:
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The fact is that two families of very old passions have been awakened and set in motion by this
new conflict. And such is the somber fervor that they breathe that if they had troops behind them, I
ask myself if that civil war of which everyone speaks so much might not become one day a reality
for Spain [emphasis mine].26

While important to examine supporters of the two camps, it is extremely difficult
to establish arbitrary designations for Germanophiles compared to Francophiles. In
general, however, the clergy, army, aristocracy, landowning elites, upper bourgeoisie,
court, Carlists and Mauristas favored the Central Powers. They wanted to maintain the
existing order and uphold Catholic and traditional values such as monarchism, discipline,
authority and a hierarchical social order. Germanophiles viewed an Allied victory as a
potential extension of democratic ideas, and hence a threat to the status quo and their
hegemonic control of the population. The Francophiles, on the other hand, consisted of
Regionalists, Republicans, Socialists, professional middle classes and intellectuals, who
advocated domestic reform. They sought to eradicate the current system’s corruption and
introduce democracy, and viewed the war as a struggle of democracy against autocracy.
In other words, the question of choosing sides transcended the question of Britain and
France versus Germany, and became an ideological struggle of the old order versus a new
order, rigidity versus change.
Very few people supported becoming militarily involved in the conflict, which
meant the question was not so much whether Spain should remain neutral, but rather
what shape that neutrality should assume. Those favoring the Central Powers emphasized
absolute neutrality because they realized that Spanish intervention on behalf of the
Central Powers would be military suicide given Spain’s geographic location. The
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Francophiles, on the other hand, represented a variety of opinions. The majority favored
benevolent neutrality toward the Allies because of Spain’s economic and military
position, while a few called for a diplomatic rupture from Germany. One Francophile,
Hermógenes Cenamor called the policy “shameful, depressive, anti-patriotic and
inhuman.”27 In the early stages of the debate, the “old-order” Germanophiles had one
distinct advantage. They could advocate the official policy of the Spanish government,
disguising pro-German feelings as patriotism and opposition to foreign interference in
Spanish affairs. The Francophiles’ position, to the contrary, could be viewed as
borderline treason.
As society split into segments, dynastic politicians struggled to maintain the
appearance of absolute neutrality, but it quickly became evident where their sympathies
truly lay. While Romanones and many Liberals clearly favored the Western powers,
some Liberal party members opposed Romanones and supported his rival, the Marquis of
Alhucemas, and were thus labeled Germanophiles. Within the Conservative party, many
such as José Sánchez Guerra, Minister of the Interior, and General Ramón Echague,
Minister of War, were considered supporters of the Central Powers, while Dato and
Marquis de Lema, his Foreign Minister, were believed to favor the Allies. Despite
personal divisions, with the exception of Romanones, the dynastic politicians disguised
their positions by appearing unified relative to neutrality.28
King Alfonso XIII was perhaps the most important figure in the neutrality debate.
The war divided his court with the Queen Mother, the Austrian Archduchess María
Cristina on the one side, who harbored pro-German sentiments, against the king’s wife,
27
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Victoria Eugenia, who staunchly defended her British homeland. The Entente assumed
Alfonso supported their cause, but although Alfonso displayed pro-Allied tendencies,
overshadowing them was his strong desire to consolidate his power at home and for
Spain to play a leading role in post-war Europe. From the beginning of his reign, Alfonso
determined to rejuvenate his country as evidenced in a diary entry dated immediately
after he assumed the throne:
I can be a King who will be filled with the glory of having regenerated his country, whose name
will pass on in history as an imperishable memento of his reign… I hope at the same time to
revive my country and make her, if not powerful, at least sought for as an ally.29

Yet, as ardently as Alfonso believed that Spain should remain neutral, he proved more
than willing to solicit offers from both sides to gain significant advantages.
When the Spanish government emphatically declared its neutrality in the summer
of 1914, officials could not anticipate the domestic and diplomatic turmoil that erupted
over the next four years. The leaders recognized that militarily, economically, and
diplomatically, Spain was completely unprepared to enter a large-scale conflict. Thus,
they clearly established their neutrality policy. Even so, the hostilities still had a dramatic
effect on most segments of society, which the government proved unprepared to handle.
Thus, King Alfonso and his government’s course of action would be harshly tested.
Nevertheless, they adhered to their policy regardless of the consequences.
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Chapter Three
The War Enters Spain
The subversive power of the war, which is sinking emperors, throwing out kings, making
all the old hierarchies tremble, is now reaching us.1
As Europe settled into a state of war, Spain settled into an uneasy state of
neutrality. The government resolved to keep Spain from entering the war, yet this became
increasingly difficult due to the pressure to choose a side in the conflict. This pressure
launched Spain into a four-year diplomatic struggle, in their effort to maintain relations
with the belligerent powers. While neutrality kept Spain out of the war, it could not
escape the economic consequences of a general European conflict. Domestic crises and
poor diplomatic maneuvering created a tenuous situation for Spain and brought it to the
brink of war.
Germany had a significant diplomatic advantage compared to the Entente in its
relationship with Spain, especially during the war’s early years. A major factor at the
onset of the conflict was Germany’s influential presence in the Spanish press, perhaps its
most effective and sophisticated propaganda effort. The mastermind, Ambassador Prince
Max von Ratibor, convinced the German Foreign Office to bribe numerous Spanish
periodicals to present a pro-German viewpoint. In a report issued on 12 October 1914,
Ratibor argued that the Foreign Office must fund propaganda efforts in Spain, citing a
report by “a good source” that the French invested 600,000 francs to influence Spanish
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opinion, and lamenting that the Germans had already lost several important newspapers,
such as El Liberal, La Correspondencia de España, La Imparcial, and the Herald de
Madrid.2 In response, the Foreign Office agreed to fund portions of the Spanish press, a
move welcomed by Ratibor who commented, “I believe that they [papers and newspaper
workers] will work now for our side with doubled enthusiasm. And also they will
persuade others to become Germanophiles.”3 He inundated the Spanish press with proGerman sentiments, in ways unmatched by the Entente, which proved tremendously
successfully in convincing the population to remain neutral. This German influence grew
so strong it even led several Spaniards to establish periodicals to oppose the
Germanophile media and convey pro-Allied perspectives. This included España, one of
several journals founded by politician Luis Araquistain with the belief that it was
absolutely necessary to counter the German propaganda threat.4
Germany also had greater advantages in its diplomatic negotiations than the
Entente to convince Spain to maintain absolute neutrality, the most helpful course of
action for Berlin. Since Germany realized an alliance with Spain was impossible because
of geographic and economic barriers, it could be very generous with territorial promises
as lands appealing to Spain did not belong to the Central Powers. The Allies, on the
contrary, found themselves facing a significant predicament. They could either deny
territorial concessions to Madrid and further German propaganda that Britain and France
were Spain’s enemies attempting to keep her weak, or they could offer valuable territory
2
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in exchange for what they recognized would be insignificant support.
As King Alfonso XIII persisted in his foreign policy goals, diplomatic blackmail
marked his early efforts, whereby he manipulated offers from the European powers to try
to achieve the best results for Spain. Germany offered several tempting territories to
Spain, ranging from Gibraltar and Tangier to control of Portugal and French Morocco.
Alfonso responded by approaching the Entente to solicit a counteroffer. While the Allies
remained open to negotiations, they did not intend to promise concessions without the
guarantee of a significant return. A conversation between Alfonso and a French official
states:
His Majesty expressed friendly sentiments but said that he was in a difficult position between the
Germans, who were supported by the Spanish Right and who offered him Gibraltar, Morocco and
a free hand in Portugal, and the Allies who seemed not to feel gratitude for the services which he
had rendered them. The King refrained from stating what he expected from the Allies, but
Monsieur Cooreman derived the impression he had Tangier in mind. His Majesty did not
apparently mention the nature of the services to which he made allusion…5

The British realized the benefits of having Spain join the Entente, but they also strongly
supported Spain’s neutrality as the preferable option because they recognized Spain’s
limited military capabilities. If Spain joined the Allies, Britain determined its best course
of action, assuming France agreed, would be to offer Tangier in exchange for its active
involvement.
All this changed when Italy joined the Entente in May 1915. While Spain was the
largest neutral on the continent, Italy’s strategic location made it a far more desirable ally.
Geographically, the Entente’s close proximity to Spain meant it could be easily coerced
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economically. Italy, on the other hand, was much closer to the Central Powers
geographically, potentially making its influence much more decisive. With Italy on its
side, the Entente no longer needed to pursue an alliance with Spain, which would have
required the sacrifice of territory more valuable than the minimal assistance that Spain
would have provided.6
While King Alfonso unsuccessfully pursued his foreign policy goals, Prime
Minister Eduardo Dato and the Spanish government determined their official policy —to
maintain neutrality. However, this policy would be harshly tested, as it placed the
government in an extremely precarious position. The country began to crumble as drastic
social, demographic and economic changes altered the domestic landscape. These harsh
realities would be exacerbated by a severe diplomatic crisis that pushed neutrality to a
breaking point.
Initially, the war presented Spain with tremendous economic opportunities as
most of Europe shifted to a war economy. Spain, capitalizing on its neutral status, began
to fill the gaps, not only supplying both sides, but also enjoying new trade outlets, thanks
to the belligerents’ inability to export. As a result, initially, Spanish industry and
commerce grew dramatically. The textile, leather goods, mining, iron, shipping and
chemical industries flourished as the warring powers’ demand rose exponentially.
Between 1913 and 1918, electrical capacity almost doubled, positively affecting the
technological base of Spanish industry.7 The significant drop in imports and astounding
increase in exports produced an economic boom. In 1914, the balance of trade was minus
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154 million pesetas, but by 1915 it had expanded to plus 275 million pesetas. Spanish
gold reserves doubled between 1914 and 1916 from 543 million to one billion thirty-two
million pesetas in July 1916.8 This tremendous growth stimulated the Spanish banking
industry, expanding it from fifty banks nationally at the beginning of the war to eighty by
the end, while the number of accounts quadrupled during the same period.9
However, this seemingly amazing economic transformation almost destroyed
Spain. The inability to import basic commodities coupled with unregulated exports and
the overabundance of currency produced rampant inflation, while skyrocketing prices
increased the divisions between the rich and poor. The inflation rate increased from
106.9 in September 1914 to 123.6 by March 1917, then to 145.4 in March 1918.10 Spain’s
inadequate infrastructure almost collapsed under the pressure, and while the northern and
eastern industrial areas thrived, other regions faced devastating unemployment and
shortages. The war also cut Spanish migration to North America by seventy-five percent,
which previously served as an important safety valve for rural Spain.11 This created an
overpopulation of rural areas, forcing many peasants to migrate to major cities such as
Barcelona and Bilbao. These economic changes brought about by neutrality primarily
benefited the bourgeoisie and the land-owning elite who experienced a tremendous
accumulation of wealth. However, while one portion of the population enjoyed a period
of extreme wealth, the war also brought deteriorating living conditions and shortages of
basic commodities for the majority, creating an even greater divide among Spain’s social
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classes.12
Eduardo Dato’s government refused to deal with the international and domestic
crises created by the war and kept the Cortes, the Spanish legislature, closed. Meanwhile,
Spain desperately required extreme economic reform to facilitate the growing demand
and production. Although it experienced an economic boom immediately following the
outbreak of the war, Spain’s slow rate of industrialization rendered it unable to sustain
production to meet demand. Even the British recognized the hardships in Spain as the
Ambassador Sir Arthur Hardinge sent reports on the drastically deteriorating situation,
including difficulties importing wheat and coal, the worsening condition of the Spanish
railways, and the increasing problems with overall transportation resulting from German
attacks on marine transport and the ensuing overburdened land transport system.13
However, even with rampant inflation, the government appeared to be unconcerned about
the economic problems as many of its leaders were among the few that benefited from
the war’s economic upheaval. After the initial economic boom and industrial expansion,
Spain’s sluggish industrialization and inadequate infrastructure prevented further growth,
leaving much of the population struggling to survive, while the governing elite enjoyed
unprecedented wealth. “The agricultural oligarchy remained uninterested in the structural
reform of the country; it, too, benefited from an increase in exports, but it did not wish to
see its power diminished by the growing urban classes.”14
The failure to resolve these economic difficulties resulted in the crisis de
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subsistencias, as the population protested their deteriorating conditions. An Instituto de
Reformas Sociales report elaborated on the problems faced in Barcelona, including
transportation difficulties on both land and sea and the subsequent hindrance in the
import of basic necessities, as well as shortages of construction and industrial materials,
which primarily affected the middle and working classes.15 The first indications of
discontent appeared in 1914 when many citizens attacked those suspected of abetting the
growing crisis. An article in the newspaper El Consejo denounced the rising cost of bread
in Madrid, arguing that the local bakers were taking advantage of the difficult
circumstances to fully control and manipulate the price. The article then criticized the
government officials that allowed such policies. “We cannot understand how they defend
the interests of an entity that aspires to monopolize the production of bread in Madrid in
order to impose a price that their egos dictate.”16 The public outcry soon expanded to
food riots and assaults on shops. The government’s failure to address the increasing
domestic concerns plaguing the country resulted in Dato’s fall from power in December
1915. He was replaced by Count Conde de Romanones, leader of the dynastic Liberal
party, during whose administration, the neutrality policies and Liberal Monarchy would
be harshly tested.
Despite previous concerns regarding his position on neutrality, the Spanish
population initially welcomed the Romanones administration because it promised to
address the crisis de subsistencias by stimulating the economy to combat shortages,
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inflation and unemployment. It also focused on agricultural improvements, public credit
and transport, national defense, the judicial and educational systems and reducing
expenses in Morocco. However, such lofty and unachievable goals only served to
demonstrate that the dynastic parties could not adapt to a rapidly changing Spain. As the
country experienced the rise of mass politics, the turno suffered a decline in popular
support. While the government attempted unsuccessfully to address the domestic
problems, an international crisis with Germany emerged, almost destroying the neutrality
policy. As the government ignored the devastating domestic problems to focus on the
neutrality issue, it pushed Spain into a chaotic situation, which the leadership proved
completely unprepared to handle.
As mentioned, following his Neutralidades que matan article, Romanones found
it extremely difficult to deny his pro-Allied tendencies. Although still adamantly stressing
his adherence to the neutrality policy, he secretly determined to establish better relations
with Britain and France, which he believed provided the only means to strengthen its
unstable economy and rebuild Spain’s lost empire, with a focus on Northern Africa.17
However, with the tenuous and ever-deepening hostility between Francophiles and
Germanophiles, Romanones recognized that he could not take the drastic step of cutting
off diplomatic relations with Germany. Thus, he could offer the Entente very little in
terms of support, and much to his dismay, Britain and France did not respond to his
approaches. In fact, they remained unconvinced that a pro-Allied prime minister could
yield a more positive outcome. After Dato’s fall, Ambassador Hardinge declared:
I am not at all sure that a more openly friendly government may be an embarrassment both for
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Spain and ourselves. Mr. Dato held the balance well, officially and privately he was most friendly.
Romanones may press for a price and try to raise the questions of Tangier.18

Romanones did not realize that his diplomatic advances would not only fail to entice the
Entente, but would trigger a harsh Central Powers attack against his leadership. As a
result, Spain came dangerously close to abandoning the policy it had so adamantly
defended.
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Chapter Four
Neutrality’s Ultimate Test
Silence at present is a crime; for if we wait until the moment of victory to show our
sympathy for the victor it is probable we shall be too late.1
The circumstances that almost brought Spain into the war involved the sinking of
Spanish merchant ships by German submarines. Starting as a minor diplomatic matter,
the situation developed into a major crisis that brought Madrid’s relations with Germany
to a breaking point. As the war progressed, Spain desperately attempted to grapple with
the severe economic crisis plaguing the country, and exports were crucial in the attempt
to keep the Spanish economy afloat. As mentioned, many new outlets emerged for
Spanish exports, and as a neutral, it demanded undisturbed access to the world’s shipping
lanes to maintain its trade.2 However, Germany’s submarine warfare campaign sank
numerous Spanish vessels at a great loss to the economy.3 The new Premier, Conde de
Romanones, already nurturing a Francophile perspective, utilized this opportunity to
commence a slow shift to a policy favoring the Entente.
In February 1915, Germany launched a submarine campaign against merchant
shipping to reduce Allied supplies, particularly to Britain, to a level that would force
London out of the war. Over a period of seven months, German submarines sank 787,120
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tons of merchant shipping.4 The Germans suspended the program, however, because the
tonnage sunk was not worth the detrimental impact the campaign had upon the neutral
powers, most particularly the United States. Unfortunately for Spain, the halting of the
campaign was short lived. In the fall of 1916, Germany launched a restricted submarine
campaign, followed by the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on a much
larger scale in February 1917. With far more U-boats now in service, between September
1916 and January 1917, the tonnage sunk was almost double that during the campaign’s
initial seven months in 1915.5 The campaign’s success then increased during the
following months. The Germans possessed 105 U-boats, of which approximately onethird could be at sea at one time (one third received repairs, while the remaining third was
in transit). The total merchant marine tonnage sunk skyrocketed to 520,410 tons in
February 1917, 564,500 in March, and 860,330 in April.6 As the tonnage lost rates
escalated, so did the risk of alienating neutral powers. However, the Germans felt they
had to assume the risk in an effort to knock Britain out of the war before the United
States could ship millions of troops to Europe. The submarine campaign ultimately
resulted in the United States abandoning its neutrality on 6 April 1917, while creating a
serious crisis for Spain.
The first stage of the crisis occurred in 1916. The German submarine campaign of
February 1915 had a tremendous impact on Spain as it drastically hindered its trade and
exacerbated the severe shortages already being experienced in the country. Both King
Alfonso and the new Prime Minister, Count Conde de Romanones, protested what they
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perceived to be an obvious violation of Spain’s neutral rights. During the first week of
April 1916, tensions deepened even further when the Germans sank the French channel
steamer, Essex, killing the great Spanish composer Enrique Granados and his wife. Over
the next several days the German sank two Spanish vessels, the Vigo and Santanderino,
triggering public outrage. A New York Times article quoted a response from Amadeo
Hurtado, an authority on international law, who stated, “Spain should take the initiative to
bring about joint action of all neutral countries, in order to put a stop to the illegal system
which has such disastrous consequences for all neutrals.”7 Prior to these attacks, King
Alfonso appeared to switch his position in favor of the Central Powers and absolute
neutrality. However, he became extremely unnerved by the attacks and loss of life, while
Romanones expressed outrage, even petitioning the United States to form a joint protest.8
The Central Powers, realizing that with a pro-Allied Spanish Prime Minister they must
stay in Alfonso’s good graces to ensure Spain’s neutrality, issued a formal apology on 14
May 1916.
However, Germany’s attitude towards Spain changed following a June 1916
event. The German submarine U-35, presumably responsible for several successful
attacks on Allied vessels, arrived in Cartagena producing a flurry of protest from London
and Paris. The newspaper El Imparcial reported that the submarine delivered a note of
gratitude from Kaiser Wilhelm to King Alfonso because of the favorable treatment of
German officers who had surrendered to Spanish officials in Guinea after the Cameroons
in Africa surrendered to the Entente. There were, however, deep suspicions relative to the
true purpose of the visit. Many believed it was a sign of new peace initiatives between
7
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King Alfonso and Kaiser Wilhelm.9 The stern protests and Entente activity placed
pressure on German-Spanish relations, and those professing pro-Allied tendencies
worried about the image being portrayed. Fernando León y Castillo, Spanish Ambassador
to Paris, wrote Prime Minister Romanones, “’What a pity!’ The French just want proof of
our friendship, and this is the spectacle we are providing.”10 However, a speech by
Antonio Maura, the former Conservative party leader whose followers included some of
the most vocal Germanophiles, further strained German-Spanish relations. In a 10
September 1916 speech, Maura supported Romanones’ stance observing:
Spain must either take her proper place among the nations or submit to be evicted, degraded, and
trampled under foot… Spain would be foolish to refuse intimate association with these western
nations, because she naturally belongs to the same group, and because it is much easier to
harmonize the interests of Spain with those of England and France than to defend them against
France and England in alliance with any other nation.”11

The outcry to the U-35 incident led Germany to believe that Spanish opinion had
shifted toward the Allied side, and by December 1916, Berlin fully recognized that
Romanones was the main enemy within Spain. The Central Powers declared they were
ready to pursue peace terms with the Entente in early December. However, this peace
would be based on their terms and they even threatened to resume hostilities if the
Entente rejected the proposition. The Entente, however, refused to accept the Central
Power’s overtures on the basis that the war had been forced upon them, and they would
not cater to those who had initiated such a dreadful ordeal. This exchange was followed
by a note from United States President Woodrow Wilson to all the belligerents and
9
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neutrals with the goal of finding some agreement to end the war. Wilson presented Spain
the opportunity to volunteer its services as an arbiter of peace, the main goal of King
Alfonso and the government leaders. The Entente powers resented Wilson’s note
believing that peace on Germany’s terms would mean all its sacrifices had been in vain.
They clearly indicated that they would not be amenable to such approaches, thus,
Romanones recognized the detrimental impact Spain’s endorsement of this initiative
could have on its relations with the Allied powers. As a result, Romanones declined the
President’s offer and instead protested the sinking of neutral vessels as a direct violation
of the London Declaration of 1909, which outlined the rights of neutrals. He also stated
that Spain:
has always maintained the inadmissibility of the destruction of naval prizes as carried out by the
German submarines. The Spanish Government has adopted on this subject a more insistent
attitude than any other neutral, not excluding the United States; and further, it does not admit the
interpretation given by the Central Empires to international law in the destruction of ships; it has
always made representations and protests against such an interpretation.12

At this point, Germany clearly recognized the threat posed by the Romanones
administration, leading to a dramatic change in Berlin’s attitude toward Spain and a plan
to destabilize Madrid’s unfriendly government and manipulate the somewhat hostile
public opinion. The last months of 1916 witnessed extreme contradictions in Germany’s
actions in Spain. While continuing to appeal to Alfonso to maintain Spain’s neutrality,
Berlin also inaugurated a harsh propaganda campaign to sway public opinion and topple
the hostile administration. Their attacks were not limited to propaganda, as submarine
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attacks and incidents of sabotage and espionage drastically increased after September
1916. During the first two war years, German submarines sank only eight Spanish ships;
during just one week in September 1916, they sank three, and the attacks steadily
worsened after December 1916.
On 31 January 1917, Germany announced the renewal of its unrestricted
submarine warfare, which clearly delineated the Mediterranean Sea and waters
surrounding Britain and France as restricted zones. Although the potential impact on
Spain was obvious, the declaration did not illicit a strong Spanish protest. Foreign
Minister Amalio Gimeno expressed dismay over the situation in a letter to German
Ambassador Max von Ratibor, but never threatened to interrupt diplomatic relations with
Germany over the campaign’s consequences for Spain. Instead, it decried the policy as
unnecessary and harmful to Spain, whose neutral rights should be respected and honored.
The letter asked the German government to understand the economic impact this would
have upon Spain and the enormous hardhip it would impose upon its population.13
The Germans proved unsympathetic to the Foreign Minister’s pleas. The
campaign continued and by April 1917, thirty-three Spanish ships with 80,000 tons
would be sunk. This placed the Spanish government in a precarious diplomatic position.
Would they continue to allow themselves to be bullied by the Central Powers, or would
they sever diplomatic relations with Germany? This predicament accelerated the gulf
between Francophiles and Germanophiles, as those favoring Germany staunchly
supported the maintenance of strict neutrality, while those benevolent to the Entente
believed Spain could not afford acceptance of such German attacks. Francophile Luis
13
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Araquistain declared, “The neutrality of Spain depends on German submarines and if
Germany does not rectify the maritime war, they choose our belligerence,” and
furthermore that it would be a “defensive war, a war to protect our coasts, our waters, and
our commerce.”14 On the other hand, the pro-German press inundated Spain with
propaganda emphasizing what they perceived to be German hospitality. An article in the
newspaper ABC related:
Since the beginning of the war, the king, the government, and all of Spain have eloquently
demonstrated our understanding of our neutrality with hospitality and generosity. The subjects of
Germany… have met our viewpoints with only consideration and respect.15

As 1917 progressed, the crisis worsened. The Central Powers drastically increased
their propaganda campaign against Romanones, while he became even more determined
to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and move towards the Entente.
Acknowledging the deep division in Spanish public opinion, Romanones resolved to
await the right psychological moment to sever ties with Germany. Following Germany’s
announcement of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, Romanones on 1
February announced to parliament:
The decision for the Central Powers to use all possible means to stop all maritime traffic with
France, Britain, Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean entails grave consequences for Spain. This
government is resolved that the life of this country must not be disrupted. This government is
therefore determined to take such steps as may be appropriate in these circumstances.16

Romanones’ moment of truth came on 9 April 1917. Without prior warning, a
German submarine torpedoed the San Fulgencio en route to Spain with desperately
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needed British coal. This provided the last straw for Romanones and the perfect
opportunity to justify terminating diplomatic relations with Germany. In a letter to
Spanish Ambassador to France, Fernando León y Castillo he related, “The crucial
moment has arrived, the sinking of the San Fulgencio has been the final straw. The route
I will take is already determined in the direction that you know.”17 Romanones believed
that, diplomatically, Spain could not afford to allow this treatment by the Germans. If
Spain did not stand up against these attacks, he feared it would mark Spain’s final demise
into the realm of insignificant European powers. He intended to forward a stronglyworded note to the German government as a prelude to breaking off relations. However,
Romanones fully realized the dangerous game he was playing. In his letter to León y
Castillo, he related “the struggle between the Germanophiles and myself is to the
death.”18
Although Romanones was adamant in how Spain should proceed at this point,
other members of the Cortes and, more importantly, King Alfonso XIII disagreed. They
refused to accept Romanones’ harsh language for fear of drawing Spain into the conflict.
The German propaganda campaign aimed against Romanones reached astounding levels,
even affecting the opinions of governmental members. The Germans threatened the
ruling elites that if Spain joined the Entente, they may suffer the same fate as the Russian
ruling class following the revolution. Even the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Arthur
Hardinge reported, “It is quite true that the Russian revolution produced an entire change
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in the King of Spain’s feelings towards the Allies.”19 The situation was exacerbated by
the fact that Romanones’ policies received overwhelming support from members of the
left including Socialist leader Pablo Iglesias. Famed writer and intellectual, Miguel de
Unamuno even directly called for a complete rupture in diplomatic relations with
Germany and a re-orientation of Spain’s international politics to favor the Entente.20 As
domestic opinion continued to destabilize, virtually all members of the Spanish
government demanded the maintenance of strict neutrality. These events forced
Romanones to resign, but he refused to leave quietly. On 19 April he stated, “The time
has come when every man of conscience must give his vote and take part in the European
conflict. In tendering my resignation to the King, I voted for France.”21
What could have drastically impacted the future of Spain would result in
diplomatic humiliation and Romanones’ demise. The Entente did not respond to his
approaches because there was no certainty that Spanish involvement would have any
effect on the war’s outcome. Thus, Entente members believed the best course for Spain
would be to remain neutral. This, coupled with Germany’s resolve to ensure Spanish
neutrality, proved to be insurmountable obstacles for Romanones. Although realizing the
potential consequences of absolute neutrality, he maintained the minority view. With the
destructive war continuing without end, the chaos that had emerged in Russia and Spain’s
own domestic troubles, the government, supported by much of the population, believed
that intervention in the war was not only undesirable, but also impossible.
19
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Chapter Five
A Nation Revolts
The war is a revolution, and here in Spain we must make [a revolution] of our own.1
While the government wrestled with the most difficult diplomatic crisis of the
war, it neglected to recognize increasing domestic discontent. The maintenance of
Spain’s neutrality remained foremost in the politician’s minds because no matter what
their personal inclinations, they believed involvement was not just undesirable, but
impossible. While the government acknowledged the fact that Spain was in no position to
participate in the war, it refused to acknowledge why. The liberal monarchy failed to
come to grips with the extreme changes occurring in the country. The division of opinion
over the war paved the way for the rise of mass politics in Spain, but the government
leaders neglected to identify the emerging triple threat—the working class, the military
and a political party —whose opposition to the government through 1917 would
undermine the foundation of power on which the turno so desperately depended.2
While the government struggled with Spain’s declining international prestige
resulting from the German unrestricted submarine campaign, internal strife escalated to a
critical point. The crisis de subsistencias continued to devastate the majority of the
Spanish population resulting in a storm of protest, and finally culminating in action.3 In
July 1916, the working class emerged as a formidable opponent to the Liberal Monarchy
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when two rival workers’ trade unions, the Socialist UGT and the Anarcho-Syndicalist
CNT, joined forces in an attempt to force the government to address the problems of
inflation and the crisis de subsistencias. Once united, they issued a manifesto in March
1917, which attacked the government as the cause of the problems plaguing Spain.
Is there any Spanish ruler who could affirm that our unbearable living conditions are not the
consequence of a regime of privileges, of a constant orgy of private ambitions, of an unchecked
immorality, which finds in our public institutions a shelter which should instead be provided for
the fundamental interests of the people?... The organized labour movement has therefore
concluded that it must be united in the common fight against a system of government which
protects exploitation.4

While an attack from the country’s working-class parties may not have been a
great surprise, the crisis de subsistencias produced a protest from an unexpected source.
The economic hardships had a tremendous effect on the Spanish Army’s officer corps,
the military middle class. Beginning in mid-1916, officers began organizing into military
trade unions, the juntas de defensa, to combat corruption in the army and to demand pay
increases because their buying power had been reduced by inflation. They, as with so
many others, simply believed they had suffered enough and wanted only to make a
peaceful pronunciamento.5 Furthermore, they wanted to create a movement that would
not just represent their own interests, but those of all groups struggling under the current
system.6 Their original intent was not to overthrow the government or be a major
participant in Spanish politics.
With the Bolshevik revolution consuming Russia in early 1917, King Alfonso
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became increasingly concerned about the rising influence of the juntas de defensa and
their increasing popularity as a movement to change the existing regime. As a result,
Alfonso ordered the new War Minister, General Aguilera, to disband them. On 1 June
1917, the juntas de defensa issued a declaration that announced their refusal to disband
and acknowledged their revolt against the government:
The administration has not improved and the Army is absolutely disorganized, despised and
disregarded in its vital needs: (1) ‘In its moral needs,’ which produces a lack of inner satisfaction
and stifles enthusiasm; (2) ‘In its professional or technical needs,’ through the absence of military
knowledge, which there are no means of acquiring, through the lack of unity of doctrine to direct
it, and the lack of material to carry out its ends; (3) ‘In its economic needs,’ since officers and men
are treated worse than in any other country and are even worse than civilians in analogous
circumstance in their own country.7

As the laborers and officers protested, the government faced a third attack, this
one from the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie represented by the Lliga Regionalista and led
by Francisco de Asís Cambó. The Lliga, while by no means a revolutionary party,
became leaders in the attempt to establish a coalition opposing the turno. As Spain
appeared to crumble around them, they realized the necessity of having to realign the
existing political regime by wresting power from the landed oligarchy that had controlled
the country for so many years. On 19 July, Francisco Cambó organized a peaceful
“Assembly of Parliamentarians” in Barcelona where sixty-eight gathered to denounce the
turno and demand a reorganization of the government to reflect the will of the people. He
and the Lliga gained significant support because the Republicans and Socialists decided
to participate in this initiative that, if successful, would prevent a violent insurrection.
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However, Cambó failed because of his inability to secure the support of Antonio Maura,
the former leader of the turno and recent advocate of government reform. Maura and his
followers, the Mauristas, believed in the necessity of a conservative revolution to abolish
the turno, which they believed had become a sham. The Lliga proposal seemed the
perfect opportunity for Maura as Cambó, a moderate politician, desired a regeneration of
conservatism. However, Maura refused to support the Lliga’s motion, while the juntas
also pursued Maura’s support. Thus, in 1917, Maura had the opportunity to change the
course of Spanish politics by serving as the link to join these two oppositionist
movements. In the end, however, despite his complaints against the existing system,
Maura remained loyal to the monarchy and the Liberal regime and thus would not
participate in any action that might threaten their power.8
In 1917, the country hovered on the brink of domestic chaos, compelling many to
question the leadership that had brought them to this position. It was a year of diplomatic
turning points as well with the German submarine crisis humiliating Spain and
reaffirming the belief that Madrid still represented an insignificant continental power.
Socialist journalist Luis Araquistain related, “Awakened by the war, fueled by the
Russian Revolution and the lessons of Greece, the spirit of renewal has exploded in
Spanish life.”9 However, despite these threats, the government obviously remained
resolute in maintaining its power.
But it was not meant to be. It became increasingly apparent that the government
could no longer continue its present oligarchical system. When Romanones resigned, his
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Liberal rival, Marquis of Alhucemas became Prime Minister. The Marquis attempted to
resolve some of the Romanones administration’s problems, but it proved to be too little,
too late. His government, which lasted only fifty-three days, failed because of his
inability to resolve the juntas crisis. Eduardo Dato, who fell from power in December
1915, replaced Alhucemas, but appointed almost the same Cabinet that proved unable to
handle the diplomatic and domestic concerns two years earlier. His return resulted in
outrage from all the groups excluded from the turno.
In an attempt to neutralize the growing domestic crisis and the emerging threat
against the regime, Dato’s Cabinet developed a strategy designed to quell both the danger
of Spain’s unified working class and the rising popularity of the juntas. Dato hoped to
capitalize on bourgeois fears stemming from revolutionary activity in Russia by forcing
the workers into launching a general strike. He believed that the workers would be unable
to plan and organize in advance; therefore, such a strike could be easily quelled. He also
intended to implicate the officers in the strike’s repression to provide the government the
opportunity to become the “saviour of social order.”10
Dato’s opportunity arose during a transport strike that began in Valencia on 19
July between workers and the railroad company, Compañía del Norte. The dispute
developed into a violent confrontation that halted seventy percent of Valencia’s transport.
As events stabilized, the Compañía del Norte refused to re-hire several workers fired
during the conflict. The UGT and PSOE reacted by issuing an ultimatum that they would
launch a general strike if the company did not re-hire the workers. The Compañía del
Norte refused and a strike commenced on 13 August. Those on the left immediately came
10
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to the defense of the struggling workers. The leftist periodical España encouraged, “The
Spanish rail workers are not alone in this struggle… this mobilization of the proletariat
cannot stop until it is sufficient enough to guarantee the regime change necessary to save
the dignity and decorum of our national life.”11 However, not all were so sympathetic. An
article in El Debate called the strike a “seditious, antipatriotic, revolutionary, antisocial
work of a turbulent minority.”12 Exactly as Dato anticipated, the strike failed. Successful
in limited areas, the army violently suppressed the revolt. Evidence strongly suggests that
this was not the Socialists’ preferred course of action, but that the situation was forced
upon them. Daniel Anguiano, a member of the strike committee and President of the
Railway Trade Union asked:
Who could benefit from a strike then? ...We did not want it… We were prepared to accept all
kinds of compromises… We intended to avoid it until the last moment… but Dato wanted to
discredit the labour movement and to justify the repression of a general strike which he himself
was provoking so as to consolidate his position in power, obtain a decree of dissolution of Cortes
and maintain the fiction of the Turno.13

Although the strike failed as planned, Dato’s hopes of changing the population’s
perceptions of the government were dashed. The crushing of the workers’ parties did
nothing to address the severe domestic issues plaguing the country, German submarines
still wreaked havoc on Spanish shipping, and most of the social and political forces in
Spain came to despise the government. Although Dato intended to link this perceived
revolution to the Assembly of Parliamentarians, he failed, and the government settled into
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an extremely perilous situation.
Further complicating matters was the juntas’ loss of popularity due to their brutal
crushing of the August strike. The juntas realized that Dato had forced them to repress a
strike provoked by his government and now decided to assume a more active role in
destroying the political corruption that had permeated Spain for so long. The situation
came to a head on 26 October when the juntas delivered an ultimatum to the king,
demanding that he create a national government that respected the popular vote. This
ultimatum led to the demise of Dato and end of the turno as it had previously existed.
After a record eight days without a government, King Alfonso established a new Cabinet
with the Marquis of Alhucemas again as Prime Minister. Although the turno still
maintained a majority within the administration, these events proved to be a turning point
for them.
Increasing divisions and growing opposition plagued a government that for so
long had not been challenged. The dynastic parties never again enjoyed the hegemonic
control they once held as the war brought increasing political awareness to a previously
apathetic population. As Luis Arquistain warned, “A government that attempts to
suffocate public opinion goes the way of political suicide and historic failure.”14 While
the country could revel somewhat in the fact that the turno had been overthrown, the
devastating failure of the August strike crushed any hopes of democracy becoming a
reality for Spain. Political strife only increased and although the dynastic elites’ power
had been checked, internal divisions and rival factions among the other political parties
created an atmosphere of instability.
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Chapter Six
The End of an Empire
“’Fatal Neutralities’ was not only an editorial, but is becoming a prophecy and if God
does not protect us it could become a catastrophe.”1
While domestic crisis enveloped the country, diplomatically, Spain’s position
continued to deteriorate even at the war’s end. Between 1918 and 1923, Spain’s status as
a continental power diminished further as it dealt with the consequences of its neutrality
policy. In the latter months of the war, Germany’s submarine campaign persisted
unabated. Even when this threat finally ended with the November 1918 armistice, Spain’s
troubles continued. As the peace negotiations commenced, it became evident that King
Alfonso and the government’s ambitions for Spain’s postwar role would not come to
fruition. Instead, Spain was forced to come to terms with the bitter consequences of its
four-year neutrality policy.
Even after ousting the pro-Allied Prime Minister Conde de Romanones from
power in April 1917, Germany remained unrelenting in its submarine campaign believing
that Spain still favored the Entente. Following the signing of the March 1918 Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, which ended Russia’s participation in the war, Germany launched its
major Spring 1918 Western front offensive, expanding its attack against Spanish
merchant ships, much to the dismay of the Spanish people. In a poem entitled, “La guerra
submarina,” poet Goy de Silva lamented, “the waters are always restless, dancing
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eternally while death prowls at the bottom of the sea.”2 An article in the newspaper,
España Nueva, lashed out more directly against these attacks and encouraged the
government to act. “We believe the government must hurry to formulate a response of
protest to Germany as this constitutes a violation of the rights of Spanish citizens to trade
with whomever they please.”3
The government, however, proved unwilling to challenge Germany. The
Germanophile newspaper, ABC, quoted Antonio Maura as saying, “nothing we have
suffered justifies rupturing relations.”4 Such unwillingness was met by great opposition
from the Spanish populace, as demonstrated in writer and intellectual Miguel de
Unamuno’s reply to Maura’s speech: “In 1898, the tragic year for the regency, they
sacrificed the dignity of the country for dynastic interests. Today, we do not know what
dark interests or evils they want to sacrifice.”5 Even Britain and France expressed outrage
over Spanish losses, urging Spain to demand that the German government replace ships
lost to submarines. But neither domestic opposition nor Entente encouragement could
convince Spain to take a stand against the German threat. Madrid feigned negotiations
and as an article in Diario Universal reported, “While Spain negotiates, Germany sinks
our ships.”6
Thus, the Spanish government found itself in the same position as in early 1917,
as German attacks flourished and Madrid had to decide how much more they would
tolerate. In March 1918, King Alfonso appeared to have finally formed a government that
2
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could assist Spain in its continued trouble as the Ministerio de Primates (Cabinet of
Titans) assumed power. Headed by former Prime Minister Antonio Maura, it included
two other previous turno leaders, Eduardo Dato and Conde de Romanones, as well as a
group of Spain’s most experienced and dynamic politicians. Had Spain finally found the
leadership necessary to restore its national honor?
Despite the apparent strength of the new regime, it proved just as incapable as the
previous governments in neutralizing the German threat, which had now expanded its
disturbances within Spanish borders. In early 1918, several Spanish newspapers reported
extensive German espionage being conducted in Spain and revealed Germany funded
anarchists wreaking havoc within the country. Rather than address these subversive
activities, the Cabinet of Titans revealed their impotence by passing a law of espionage in
July, which essentially silenced the Spanish press.7 The law forbade the press from
reporting on news that related to the Spanish neutrality policy, while also forbidding all
negative representations of diplomats or political leaders. In addition, it restricted the
“spreading of news of a nature to alarm Spaniards.”8
As German attacks continued, events finally came to a head during an incident
that forced the government to realize that the situation was spiraling out of control. On 13
July, the Germans torpedoed the Spanish ship Ramón de Larriñaga, carrying oil from
New York, as it entered Spanish waters even machine-gunning its sailors after they
abandoned ship. Maura finally responded with outrage stating, “The limits of Spanish
patience have been reached… This last example of contempt and brutality will have to be
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solved by the government without further delays.”9 At last, it appeared that the Spanish
government would stand up against the German violation of its neutral rights. The
government warned Germany on 10 August that if they sank any further Spanish vessels,
any tonnage lost would be replaced by German and Austro-Hungarian ships which had
sought refuge in Spanish ports at the war’s outbreak. However, Spanish expectations
were completely dashed, as Germany replied that any seizure of its ships would be
considered an act of war. Germany then continued to torpedo five more Spanish vessels
the following month.
In summer 1918, the Spanish government once again had to decide if they would
halt German bullying. Spain’s leaders buckled and again cowered to German wishes.
Spain did not achieve a diplomatic victory as hoped by Maura and his Cabinet. Rather
than seizing German vessels in port, the Spanish government was forced to accept a
German agreement to loan ships to Spain only after Germany decided which ones to loan.
Thus, the Germans completely humiliated the Spanish as the war turned to the Entente’s
favor.
When the armistice was ratified in November 1918, and Conde de Romanones
again became Prime Minister in December, Spaniards retained the hope that their country
could play a role in the new European political arena. After the United States entered the
war in April 1917, King Alfonso, seeing himself as the leader of the neutral nations,
stated that as, “the sole remaining neutral nation of influence and power,” Spain should
lead the rest of Europe to peace.10 However, the Entente rebuffed Alfonso’s claim. A
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letter from the head of the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador to Spain
described a recent discussion with the Spanish Ambassador and responded to the Spanish
Ambassador’s claims:
I listened to this enumeration with some surprise, and, indeed, felt some difficulty in reconciling
the general arguments of his Excellency with my own recollection of the events of the past four
years. I refrained, however, from casting any doubt upon his presentation of history, and contented
myself with remarking that, if the Allies had profited by what they had obtained from Spain, Spain
herself had been a much greater gainer by the transaction. She has escaped the ravages of war….
So far as my information went, there was no other European country that had suffered less from
the war than Spain.11

Thus, the war not only failed to improve Spain’s European position, it emphasized its
status as a secondary continental power not even worthy of an invitation to the peace
negotiations.
As if Spain’s failed attempts to participate in the peace negotiations were not
humiliating enough, France punished Madrid for the Germanophile stance of many of its
key institutions. Following the war, Spain was embroiled in an unpopular and
underfunded campaign in Morocco. Given the army’s weakened condition, Spain was no
match for the well-armed and well-trained Moroccan Moorish guerillas. Paris, however,
did not come to Spain’s aid. The result was the disaster at Annual in summer 1921, where
more than 12,000 Spanish troops died, while the Moors overran most of the eastern
Moroccan Protectorate.12 Morocco, the territory Spain had been desperate to maintain
and expand during the war, not only created an unsolvable problem with France, but also
11

Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watts, eds. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, From the First to the Second World War. Vol. 7,
Portugal, Spain and the Peace Treaty; African Questions; Morocco; Germany and the Treaty. The Paris
Peace Conference of 1919, ser. ed. M. Dockrill, no. 9, (University Publications of America, 1989), 10.
12
Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918, 181.

59

led to insurmountable problems with the indigenous population.13 This postwar
Moroccan crisis, much like the 1898 Spanish-American War disaster and Spanish
impotence against the German submarine campaign, added to Spain’s international
humiliation and guaranteed that it would remain a secondary country in European
politics.
As the war ended and the European nations attempted to bring peace to the
ravaged continent, Spain found itself isolated. Germany had successfully embarrassed the
formerly great empire and Spain had to accept its second-rate status. Romanones would
later relate how neutrality “had a devastating effect in diminishing the international
prestige of Spain” and “interrupted, if not destroyed, its work in international politics.”14
In addition, domestic discontent continued to ravage the country, as the government
ultimately proved unable to create internal stability. Following numerous attempts to
establish a government that would address the country’s increasing problems, these
regimes rose and fell until September 1923 when General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s
military dictatorship filled the long-standing political vacuum.
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Conclusion
The world in war and in peace, Spain is alone.1
When the European war broke out in 1914 and Spain immediately declared
neutrality, the population felt optimistic about their nation’s future. Realizing the country
was in an unfavorable position militarily and economically, most Spaniards favored
neutrality as the wisest course of action. They also believed that it offered the longsought opportunity for Spain to regain its position as a major continental player.
However, despite these high hopes, Spanish neutrality failed to yield such positive
consequences.
While certainly not prepared to enter the war, the conflagration nevertheless
affected Spain with devastating results. The government proved completely unprepared
to address the domestic crises that materialized, particularly food shortages and inflation.
The inability to resolve these issues, exacerbated by the intensifying divisions between
Francophiles and Germanophiles, led to the emergence of a civil war of words. A country
once consumed by apathy became filled with outrage. Individuals who had never
participated in politics now chose a side in the conflict, seeking to save their country from
further hardship. This, however, created further discontent, revolution, and the fall of
numerous governments. Between 1918 and 1923, twelve governments and three
parliaments failed to overcome the social instability. Each government proved either
unable or unwilling to address the demands of the new politically conscious society, and
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the various political groups could not provide an organized, effective replacement
government. “It was anarchy that led nowhere, more terrible than the anarchy of
revolutions, because the instinct for self-preservation which breeds revolutions seemed to
have died in Spanish society.”2
As Spain wrestled with these domestic crises, its diplomatic efforts also failed.
The Spanish government’s unwillingness to join either alliance left them completely
isolated at the war’s end. King Alfono’s desire to serve as the leader of the peace
negotiations proved unrealistic, as Spain even failed to receive even an invitation to the
Versailles conference. It had been completely humiliated by German actions, furthering
the widely-held belief that Spain was barely a second-rate continental power.
However, while the negative consequences of Spanish neutrality appear obvious,
would intervention have yielded more positive results? At the outbreak of the war, Spain
was in no position to participate in a major military conflict on the continent. Militarily
unprepared, economically backward and diplomatically isolated, the government realized
that involvement was impossible, and Spain’s problems only worsened throughout the
war. Although leaders, such as Conde de Romanones, desired intervention, the
government’s general stance was that intervention would prove disastrous because of the
serious potential for the outbreak of a civil war in the divided country. If Spain joined the
Entente, German enmity would result. Considering the impact of Germany’s submarine
campaign upon Spain, it could face maritime disaster if it intervened in the conflict.
Germany, recognizing Spain’s endemic instability, would surely have created further
chaos, particularly because of the incredibly strong Germanophile presence in the
2
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country. Germany controlled much of the Spanish press, while also maintaining a
significant covert force for espionage and sabotage. Thus, Germany could easily wreak
havoc if Spain opted to join the Entente. On the other hand, had Spain joined the Central
Powers, Britain and France, because of their geographic location, could have easily
inflicted similar damage upon the Spanish. So, as Italy, Romania and other nations
abandoned neutrality in favor of intervention, Spain remained firm in its diplomatic
position. Despite all the negative consequences of neutrality, it remained the only option
given Spain’s extreme instability.
The impact of the First World War upon the belligerent powers is obvious, but
one must not ignore its impact on neutral powers. Spain suffered tremendously between
1914 and 1918. Although, in general, the government and population remained optimistic
that neutrality would prove beneficial to the nation, it was in vain. Spain faced a tragic
situation as either neutrality or intervention would have produced terrible consequences.
The government chose what it anticipated to be the lesser of two evils and while this
option proved costly, the alternative could have been even more devastating. Although
Spain did not emerge from the war with increased prestige and diplomatic standing in
Europe, as many had hoped, the outcome could have been even bleaker than the reality
had it intervened. The belief that neutrality would enhance its status as a Great Power
proved false and the Spanish Empire ceased to have any influence. Even more powerless
and divided, Spain emerged from the war a mere shadow of its former self.
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